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This book chapter addresses equity ownership strategy in greenfield investments by multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) in the emerging markets (EMs). It one of few studies to hypothesize and 
analyze influences of host EM physical infrastructure in relation to investment decisions of MNEs.  
We use resource dependence theory (RDT) as a theoretical basis and test the moderating effects of 
firm resources like size and host country investment experience. Moreover, the current study 
assumes a more nuanced approach to studying equity ownership by analyzing wholly owned 
subsidiaries vs. joint ventures (JVs) and including majority vs. minority JVs in the analysis as well. 
The empirical results based on greenfield investments undertaken by Nordic (Danish, Finnish, 
Norwegian and Swedish) MNEs in EMs during 1990-2015 reveals the importance of host country 
physical infrastructure for high equity ownership strategy. Moreover, host country investment 
experience moderates the effect of physical infrastructure on equity ownership strategy. Finally, 
the analysis of a sub-sample of greenfield JVs reveals that determinants of equity ownership 
strategy differ somewhat between greenfield JV or greenfield WOS. 
KEY WORDS: Equity Ownership, Emerging Markets, Greenfield Investments, MNE Size, MNE 




Foreign direct investment (FDI) establishment mode strategy is typically viewed as the 
multinational enterprises’ (MNE) choice whether to acquire an existing local enterprise 
(acquisition) or to establish a start up from scratch (greenfield investment) (Dikova and van 
Witteloostuijn, 2007; Slangen and Hennart, 2008; Slangen, 2011; Arslan et al., 2015). Cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As), as a specific entry strategy have received increasing attention 
of IB researchers (see e.g. Chen, 2008; Contractor et al., 2014; Arslan and Dikova, 2015; Ahammad 
et al., 2017; Dikova et al., 2017). Despite their popularity, M&As are not always among the 
strategic options of MNEs especially when investing in emerging markets (EMs), where suitable 
acquisition targets often lack. Under such circumstances, MNEs must choose to establish presence 
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in EMs through greenfield investment. In fact, greenfield investments account for the majority of 
global FDI flows i.e. 63% (UNCTAD, 2015).  
 
Earlier research has established that greenfields can offer specific investment advantages. For 
example, it is relatively easier to transfer MNE practices to greenfield subsidiaries compared to 
acquired ones, thereby, making their integration into MNE’s global strategy relatively smooth 
(Meyer and Su, 2015; Ayden et al., 2017). Greenfield subsidiaries can also offer access to the 
sectors and industries, where the possibility to acquire local firms is limited due to certain 
restrictions (Chang et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2014; Arslan and Larimo, 2017). It therefore comes as 
a surprise that greenfield investments as a specific establishment mode, have received far less 
research attention compared to cross-border M&As. The specific ownership decisions taken in the 
context of greenfield investments have received even less research attention.  
 
In this study, we investigate the role of local context on the equity ownership strategy in greenfield 
investments undertaken in EMs. Recently Arslan and Larimo (2017), considered the role of local 
context by analyzing the influences of institutional distance and international trade freedom on 
ownership strategy in greenfield investments. Local context however goes beyond institutional 
framework and often influences the extent of resource dependency of MNEs in EMs. Related 
research has found that physical infrastructure is a key determinant of FDI flows as access to 
utilities (electricity, gas, water), along with good transportation network and connectivity, make a 
location attractive to manufacturing FDI (e.g. Erdal and Tatoglu, 2002; Bellak et al., 2009; 
Blonigen and Piger, 2014; Tate et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2016).  In case of greenfield investments, 
host country’s physical infrastructure can be expected to significantly influence equity ownership 
strategy. As this aspect has not been addressed in earlier studies specifically, we aim to fill this gap 
in the literature.  
 
We use resource dependency theory (RDT) which focuses on resource exchange and represents a 
political economy model of organizational and inter-organizational behavior. The primary focus of 
RDT is on the environment and organizational behavior is seen as a strategic reaction to perceived 
and potential constraints imposed by the environment. The main gist of our paper is the notion that 
because organizations differ in size and experience, they may be able to reduce the resource 
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dependence (Hutchinson et al., 2007; Leonidou et al., 2007). Hence, we argue that a relatively well 
developed local infrastructure can motivate foreign MNEs to commit higher equity ownership in 
their EM greenfield subsidiaries, even in cases when they are of relatively small size or lack host 
country specific investment experience. Furthermore, earlier research on greenfield investments 
has mostly analyzed equity ownership as a dichotomous/binary choice (full vs. partial ownership) 
(e.g. Arslan and Larimo, 2017). However, the IB literature has clearly established that management 
dynamics varies significantly in different partially owned subsidiaries—i.e., in cases of minority, 
or majority owned ventures (e.g., Liu et al., 2014; Dikova et al., 2017). We also incorporate this 
aspect in our empirical analysis by considering a wider range of equity options i.e. greenfield WOS 
vs. greenfield JV, and majority greenfield JV vs. minority greenfield JV.   
 
The empirical sample is based on greenfield investments undertaken by the MNEs from open and 
highly internationalized Nordic economies (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) in selected 
EMs located in different geographical regions. The share of EMs is constantly increasing in 
international FDI flows, and reached to ca. 30% (UNCTAD, 2016). Although, EMs are generally 
viewed as being in process development of market economy institutions (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 
2010; Arslan and Dikova, 2015), their infrastructures have improved significantly in last twenty-
five years, and now some rank quite high in the global rankings of infrastructure (World Bank, 
2017; WEF, 2018). A key reason for this has been the prominence of certain EMs which by 
increasing their attraction as a location choice for manufacturing FDI achieved economic 
development and growth (e.g. Gorodnichenko et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2016). Therefore, we believe 
that our empirical setting offers an interesting context to test the study hypotheses.  
 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The next section offers theoretical discussion leading to 
study hypotheses development. After that, we briefly explain data sources and variable 
operationalization. The paper concludes with presentation of study findings, implications and 







2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Traditionally services like telecommunications, supply and distribution of electricity and water, 
construction of roads, airports, ports and railways have been considered a public-sector 
responsibility. Shortages of clean water, electricity outages, traffic congestions, frequent 
breakdowns of telephone landlines and insufficient transport capacity for reliable trade are common 
features for most EMs (Sader, 2000). Regardless of the critical importance of infrastructure for 
economic advancement, only a limited strand of research examined the effect of infrastructure 
development on the inflow of FDI.  Using annual data for Malaysia for the period from 1960 to 
2005, Ang (2008) found that expansion of infrastructure expenditure increased the inflow of FDI 
into the host country. Analyzing data from 71 countries and the number of telephones per 1,000 
inhabitants as a measure of infrastructure development, Asiedu (2002) found that, while a better 
infrastructure increased the flow of FDI to non-Sub-Saharan African countries, it had no significant 
impact on the FDI inflow to Sub-Saharan countries. Studying 293 foreign firms that invested in 
Turkey in 1995, Deichmann et al. (2003) found no evidence that infrastructure development 
attracted multinational firms to invest in Turkey. Nourzad, Greenwold and Yang (2014) added to 
this inconclusive research by reporting that the relationship between FDI and infrastructure 
depends on the size of the recipient’s economy.  
 
We build on this research but shift the focus away from FDI flows and focus on a specific type of 
foreign direct investments, namely greenfields or investments from scratch. We start from the 
widely accepted premise that greenfields are relatively risky establishment modes for several 
reasons. Greenfields are new firms and hence suffer from a liability of newness (Pennings et al., 
1994), they entail resorting to unproven combinations of inputs and lack relationships with local 
stakeholders (Slangen and Hennart, 2008). Given the elevated risk of greenfields in general and 
specifically the risk pertaining to greenfields in EMs, we consider greenfield investment ownership 
stake assumed by foreign investors as a means of reducing investment risk.  We use resource 





According to RDT no organization is entirely self-sufficient hence inter-organizational exchange 
of resources is necessary (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). For any given organization, the need for 
resource acquisition creates dependencies between the organization and other organizations in its 
environment. Several factors would appear to exacerbate this dependence, e.g., the importance of 
the resource(s) in question to the focal organization, the relative scarcity of the resource(s), and the 
degree to which the resource is concentrated in the environment (Pfeffer, 2005). While an MNE 
making a greenfield investment is indeed able to mold the subsidiary by choosing its location and 
hiring its labor force (Hennart and Park, 1993), greenfield investments in EMs often suffer from 
implementation delays, contract cancellations, drawn-out legal disputes and lack of qualified labor. 
In addition, infrastructure in EMs may well add additional degree of investment risk. There is often 
dissatisfaction with the quality and quantity of infrastructure service provision by state-owned 
enterprises. While public utilities struggle to maintain inadequate infrastructure systems, demand 
pressures in EMs continue to build (Sader, 2000; Inderst and Stewart, 2014). Due to technology 
and innovation, an increasing number of EMs have opened these sectors to private and foreign 
investors. In telephony for example, cellular networks created a viable alternative to fixed-wire 
telephony without the technological need for monopolistic market structure (Sader, 2000). The 
extent of MNE’s dependency on underdeveloped infrastructure systems in EM would determine 
the likelihood of the multinational involvement in the provision of infrastructure services.  
 
RDT deals with strategies used by organizations to address and negotiate relationships of 
dependence.  Given that MNEs seek to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the flow of needed 
resources in EMs, the intent of such strategies is to increase the certainty associated with this flow 
by linking the organization with exchange partners, compet itors, and regulators. Although each 
strategy varies in terms of the strength and stability of the exchange relationship, several linking 
(bridging) strategies have been identified in the resource dependence literature (Snell, 1992; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 2003). For example, organizations attempt to reduce dependence either partially 
through cooperation, i.e., via joint ventures, contracting, the movement of executives and other 
personnel across organizations, resource diversification, etc., or more completely through mergers, 
officer/directorate interlocks or co-optation.  In this paper we consider greenfield joint ventures 
and a different types of shared-ownership greenfields as a means of reducing the uncertainty 
surrounding the flow of needed resources in EMs by tackling infrastructure deficiencies. It has 
7 
 
been established that organizations differ in size and modus operandi (Cavusgil, 1984; Katsikeas 
and Morgan, 1994). Because of these differences, some organizations may be able to reduce 
resource (host market) dependence (Hutchinson et al., 2007; Leonidou et al., 2007). In the next 
section, we develop our arguments on the relationships between host country infrastructure quality 
and greenfield ownership stake assumed by MNEs, considering the boundary effects of MNE size 
and experience. 
    
3. STUDY HYPOTHESES 
 
Host country physical infrastructure elements relevant to FDI decisions of MNEs, include 
transport, communication (including roads, rail network and telecommunication), energy 
production and transmission (e.g. Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Tate et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2016). 
Earlier studies have found significant correlation between amount of FDI flows received in 
manufacturing sectors in relation to above mentioned infrastructure elements (e.g. Wheeler and 
Mody, 1992, Gorodnichenko et al., 2014). Moreover, some researchers have analyzed individual 
elements of infrastructure including logistics like air, rail and road infrastructure (Deardorff, 2001; 
Tate et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2016), and telecommunications (e.g.  Leibrecht and Riedl, 2010) in 
relation to FDI flows. Other studies have focused on aspects of energy availability and transmission 
(e.g. Bellak et al., 2007; Riedl, 2010; Malhotra, 2017), and their results also showed positive 
influences of these infrastructure elements on FDI inflows received in a specific country or region.  
 
It is important to mention that even though greenfield FDIs may have different motivations (e.g. 
resource seeking or market seeking), they are affected by infrastructure conditions. For example, 
for resource-seeking FDIs, access to natural resources and transportation network (rail, road and 
air) are important. On the other hand, for market seeking greenfield FDIs are influenced by 
opportunity to establish useful manufacturing (retail) sites, and are influenced by infrastructure 
elements like electricity, gas, water as well as transportation network for transfer of manufactured 
goods. Earlier FDI studies have found all these infrastructure elements to influence choice and 
flow of FDIs (Leibrecht and Riedl, 2010; Kaur et al., 2016). In case of greenfield FDIs, many 
western MNEs invest in manufacturing sector in EMs to not only serve local market, but also 
export products to other international markets (e.g. Aggarwal, 2002; Mijiyawa, 2017). To assure 
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global competitiveness and well-functioning global value chain operations, MNEs often equip EM 
greenfields with the latest technology and machinery (which also requires training local labor 
accordingly). In manufacturing industries in particular, those of substantial investments that are 
likely protected by high-level (full) ownership. Earlier research shows that MNEs prefer control 
in local subsidiaries so that organizational practices and strategies can be easily transferred and 
implemented in the new units (e.g. Lin, 2014). Good local infrastructure  can facilitate meeting the 
productivity potential of the operation and ensure higher profitability in the long run of that 
greenfield manufacturing unit, without further (immediate or future) resource commitment on the 
side of the MNE.  Hence, availability of good infrastructure in host EM is likely linked to MNEs’ 
higher equity ownership in the greenfield subsidiary. Based on this discussion, we hypothesize 
that. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Host EM physical infrastructure is positively associated with high equity ownership 
strategy in EM greenfield investments by the Nordic MNEs.  
 
We also established earlier that in order to assure global competitiveness and well-functioning 
global operations, MNEs often equip EM greenfields with the latest technology and machinery, 
which are in turn protected by high-level (full) ownership. We suggested that the availability of 
good local infrastructure can both facilitate meeting the productivity potential of the operation and 
ensure higher profitability in the long run of that greenfield manufacturing unit, without further 
(immediate or future) resource commitment on the side of the MNE. What happens in the case of 
infrastructure deficiency in the EM where the MNE considers establishing a (manufacturing) 
greenfield subsidiary? Many MNEs may choose to invest additional resources in developing the 
local infrastructure to the extent necessary for the smooth operation of their subsidiary. However, 
investment in infrastructure development is both costly and particularly risky in EM due to 
inadequate institutional development to guarantee the protection of MNE’s investments and 
interests, local government corruption or mere asymmetric information concerning such projects, 
which may elevate initially committed resources and raise costs substantially. We argue that the 
key boundary condition in the context of the link between EM quality of infrastructure and desired 
(high/full) greenfield ownership is MNE size. MNE size has been referred to in earlier IB studies 
as a key indicator of the availability of both tangible and intangible organizational resources (e.g., 
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Bloodgood, 2014). MNE size has been found to influence strategic decisions of MNEs including 
equity ownership in their foreign subsidiaries because it is directly linked with availability of 
financial resources associated with foreign market entry, which can be expensive in many cases 
(e.g. Ang et al., 2015; Dikova et al., 2017). In case of greenfield manufacturing investments in EMs 
with deficient local infrastructure, irreversibility of such investment (i.e. impossibility to divest 
manufacturing plant or unit without making big losses) means that investing MNE may need to 
commit even more financial resources than other modes under different circumstances. This would 
only be possible for large MNEs, while we expect MNEs of smaller size to opt for lesser equity 
ownership when the host EMs does not have a infrastructure of sufficient quality. Therefore, large 
MNE size can be expected to moderate the influences of host EM infrastructure on equity 
ownership strategy. Based on this discussion, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: MNE size moderates the relationship between greenfield equity ownership strategy 
and Host EM physical infrastructure, i.e. large MNEs are likely to choose high equity ownership 
even in host EMs with relatively low physical infrastructure quality while small MNEs are likely 
to choose lower equity ownership in host EMs with relatively low physical infrastructure quality. 
Investment experience of MNEs has been referred as a major resource during internationalization 
by a number of IB researchers (e.g., Jung et al., 2010; Surdu and Mellahi, 2016).  It is important to 
further mention that earlier studies analyzing influences of international investment experience of 
MNEs have yielded conflicting results. Some studies have found general international investment 
experience to results in choice of high equity ownership in some international markets (e.g., Desai 
et al., 2004; Jung et al., 2010). However, some studies have found general international experience 
to be a non-significant determinant for equity ownership especially in case of EMs (e.g., Li and 
Meyer, 2010; Arslan and Dikova, 2015). Such studies have argued that specificities of EMs make 
them significantly differ from developed markets and as a result generic international investment 
experience becomes ineffective while devising strategies fitting to that context (Li and Meyer, 2010; 
Dikova et al., 2017). Therefore, host country investment experience is significantly important for 
MNEs, as it enriches them with important knowledge of local institutional and market dynamics 
(Ascani et al., 2016; Powell and Rhee, 2016) as well as of key players and networks in the industrial 
sectors where they operate (Vance et al., 2014; Dikova et al., 2017). In many EMs, there is a lack 
of firm specific information due to variance in reporting standards and information disclosure 
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practices (e.g. Lattemann, 2014; Moumen et al., 2015). In such situations, host country investment 
experience can further offer useful information to investing MNEs about well-established and 
attractive local firms (e.g. Arslan and Dikova, 2015), which can be useful in situations of necessary 
investments in local infrastructure projects. In case of certain EMs of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, several players in key sectors of economy are still state owned (e.g., Bruton et al., 2015; 
Estrin et al., 2016), and can yield significant economic and political influences. However, MNEs 
with host country experience can opt for high equity ownership as they can manage practical 
contingencies associated with greenfield start-up based on their prior knowledge of both formal 
and informal institutional dynamics (Powell and Rhee, 2016; Arslan and Larimo, 2017). MNEs 
with high host country experience can potentially offset some disadvantages associated with low 
quality physical infrastructure in certain host EMs based on their prior knowledge of good locations 
for manufacturing sites, as well as dealing with contingencies of energy connections and managing 
logistical network. Therefore, we expect host country experience to moderate the impacts of host 
EM physical infrastructure on equity ownership strategy in greenfield investments. Based on this  
discussion, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3: MNE host country investment experience moderates the relationship between 
greenfield equity ownership strategy and Host EM physical infrastructure, i.e. host country 
experienced MNEs are likely to choose high equity ownership even in host EMs with relatively 
low physical infrastructure quality while inexperienced MNEs are likely to choose lower equity 
ownership in host EMs with relatively low physical infrastructure quality. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Data Sources 
The study uses Nordic MNEs’ manufacturing sector FDI database that has been developed and 
constantly updated in the course of ca. 30 years by one of the authors. It has been developed using 
company annual reports, corporate websites and stock release information, and articles from 
leading business magazines (e.g. Kauppalehti, Talouselämä, Dagens Industri, Veckans Affärer, 
and Borsen). Moreover, historical reports published by national investment agencies like 
FINNFUND, SWEDFUND, and IFU (Denmark) were used in compiling and updating the dataset. 
The data has further been supplemented with information drawn from the Thompson One database. 
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The database is unique and representative of the FDIs made by Nordic MNEs in the manufacturing 
sector.  
This internal database is used for the dependent variables of the study i.e. greenfield entry mode 
(i.e. greenfield JV vs. greenfield WOS and majority greenfield JV vs. minority greenfield JV) , as 
well as independent variables of study include MNE size, and MNE host country investment 
experience. Moreover, the control variables of the study including industry R&D intensity, MNE 
international experience, and MNE product diversity, are also derived from the same internal 
database. Finally, the independent variable of EM physical infrastructure is operationalized using 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Reports, which is also a reliable data source, 
and used in many economics studies as explained later.  The operationalization of study variables 
is presented in the following section. 
 
3.2. Operationalization of Study Variables 
 3.2.1. Dependent Variable: The first dependent variable of the study is a greenfield entry mode, 
which is coded 0 for greenfield JVs (94% or less equity at time of investment) and 1 for greenfield 
WOSs (95% or more equity ownership at time of investment). As mentioned earlier, we aim to 
analyze equity ownership dynamics of greenfield investments in-depth, so we use other dependent 
variable greenfield JV for sub-sample analysis. This variable is coded 1 for majority greenfield JV 
(51% to 94% equity ownership at time of investment) and 0 for minority greenfield JV (50% or 
less equity ownership at time of investment). For the sake of simplicity in analysis, we consider 
50-50 JVs as minority JVs, as there are rather few such cases.       
 
 
3.2.2. Independent Variables:  
 Host EM Physical Infrastructure: We use the country scores from the Global Competitiveness 
Reports published by World Economic Form in second pillar of rating which is infrastructure 
(WEF, 2018). The scores in this pillar are based on both transport (road, rail and air) infrastructure 
and electricity/telephony; thereby appropriately incorporating aspects of phys ical infrastructure 
being analyzed in our study. Global Competitiveness Reports are a reliable data source, which has 
been extensively used in IB, economics and management studies, earlier.  
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MNE Size: We use natural log of global sales of the investing firms in the year preceding to the 
investment changed to Euros (e.g. Hennart and Park, 1993; Arslan et al., 2015). 
MNE Host Country Experience: We operationalize host country experience using the number 
years of presence in host country calculated from the first manufacturing investment in that 
particular market (e.g. Hennart and Park, 1993; Dikova et al., 2017). 
 
3.2.3. Control Variables: In line with past literature, the study uses a number of control variables 
at the country, industry and firm level, in order to enhance the validity of the study findings. We 
explain the operationalization of these control variables as follows.  
Investment unrelatedness: We use a dummy variable where 0 means that the greenfield investment 
is undertaken in a related industry (the 4-digit SIC code of the investment is the same as the industry 
where the firm already operates) and 1 which means that the greenfield investment was undertaken 
in an industry that is new for the firm i.e. unrelated investment (e.g. Contractor et al., 2014; Dikova 
et al., 2017) 
Industry R&D Intensity: We use a classification of various 4-digit SIC industries into four 
categories (Low-Tech, Low-Medium Tech, Medium-Tech and High-Tech) based on value added 
figures of investing firms (e.g. Dikova et al., 2017).  
MNE International Experience: We measured international experience of investing MNEs by the 
number of earlier investments undertaken by investing firms in different international markets, as 
done in several earlier studies (e.g. Kaynak et al., 2007; Dikova et al., 2017). 
MNE Product Diversity: We use the number of 4-digit SIC codes of the products in which investing 
firm has been operating based on the annual reports and websites of the firms (Chung et al., 2013; 
Dikova et al., 2017). 
Host Country Ownership Freedom: We operationalized host country ownership freedom based on 
country scores in item of foreign ownership/investment restrictions from economic freedom of the 
world annual reports (e.g. Arslan and Larimo 2017). 
Host Country Economic Growth: We use % of GDP growth in host country of in the preceding the 
investment based on UCTAD data (e,g.  Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001; Arslan et al., 2015). 
Host Country Risk: We use Euromoney country risk ratings for this variable. It is operationalized  
by subtracting country score from 100, in the year of investment or nearest available year (e.g. 






3.3 Sample Description 
The study sample consists of 921 greenfield investments made only in the manufacturing sector by 
Nordic MNEs in EMs located in Africa, Asia, Europe (Central, and Eastern Europe), and Latin 
America during 1990-2015. The main aspects of study sample are summarized in following table 
1.  
Insert Table 1 Here 
3.4 Statistical analysis method: The dependent variables of this study are dichotomous (i.e. 
greenfield JV vs. greenfield WOS and majority greenfield JV vs. minority greenfield JV). 
Therefore, we use binary logistic regression analysis to analyze the impact of the study variables 
on the equity ownership strategy of Nordic MNEs. Binary logistic regression has been used as a 
reliable statistical analysis technique in a number of past IB studies addressing different aspects of 
foreign market entry strategies of MNEs. The binomial logistic regression model is formally 
expressed as 
P (yi=1) = 1/ 1+ exp (-a-XiB) 
Where yi is the dependent variable, Xi is the vector of independent variables for the ith observation, 
a is the intercept parameter and B is the vector of regression coefficients (Amemiya, 1981). The 
recent version of SPSS i.e. PASW 24 is used for the binomial regression analysis in this study.  
 
4. STUDY RESULTS 
Insert Table 2 Here 
A bivariate correlation analysis was conducted before logistic regression tests (see Table 2) in order 
to detect any multicollinearity among the independent variables. Following Pallant (2007), 
additional multicollinearity diagnostic tests (tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF)) were 
also conducted. According to Wetherill (1986), the VIF value should not exceed 10. In the current 
study, the VIF values are lower than 5 and consequently, the potential collinearity among variables 




Insert Table 3 Here 
 
Table 3 displays the results of binomial regression analysis for the full sample of study, while table 
4 presents binomial regression results for sub-sample of greenfield JVs. The explanatory power of 
all the statistical models of the study is good, as their chi-square (χ²) values are significant at p<0.01 
level. The results show that in high R&D intensity sectors, Nordic MNEs preferred high equity 
ownership strategy (i.e. greenfield WOSs in the full sample and majority greenfield JVs in the sub-
sample analysis). Moreover, it is further visible from the result that highly diversified MNEs 
preferred low equity commitment at time of market entry (like minority JVs) as they lack product 
specific knowledge and insights from local partner are highly useful. Host country ownership 
freedom is positively associated with high equity ownership strategy, while firms tended to opt for 
low equity commitment in host countries representing high risk at the time of entry. An important 
aspect visible from the results concerns influence of general international experience. It is not 
significant for full sample analysis but becomes significant in the sub-sample of JVs. Therefore, it 
can be argued that general international experience of MNEs may not offer much benefits for 
choice of WOSs especially in EMs as discussed earlier as well. However, it can still be useful for 
making decisions concerning level of equity commitment in a JV (i.e. minority vs. majority JV). 
Insert Table 4 Here 
 
The study results show that host country infrastructure, MNE size and host country experience are 
all significant determinants of equity ownership strategy in full sample. Nordic MNEs tended to 
prefer greenfield WOSs in host EMs with relatively good physical infrastructure, and when they 
had large size and host country experience. Moreover, the results also show that host country 
experience moderates the influences of EM physical infrastructure on equity ownership strategy. 
Therefore, we get support for the hypotheses 1 and 3 in the full sample analysis. However, we do 
not get support for the hypothesis 2 concerning moderating influences of MNE size. The analysis 
of JVs sub-sample shows that key independent variable of investing MNE size is not significant  
determinant of equity ownership strategy of Nordic MNEs. We do not get support for both 
moderating hypotheses in sub-sample analysis. These findings can be explained by referring to 
specificities of JV equity ownership strategy, because in specific context of EMs, mere availability 
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of more financial resources (i.e. large MNE size) is not enough to motivate MNE for high equity 
ownership. Due to uncertainty caused by institutional and economic factors, investing MNEs may 
prefer low equity ownership strategy in greenfield investments in order to share significant costs 
associated with the start-up of greenfield manufacturing plant.  
 
5.  DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS  
 
The findings of current study offer useful implications for both managerial and academic audience. 
A key theoretical implication of current book chapter relates to use of RDT (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
2003; Pfeffer, 2005) in IB studies. Based on RDT, we hypothesized that use of shared-ownership 
greenfields (i.e. JVs) as a means of reducing the uncertainty surrounding the flow of needed 
resources in EMs with infrastructure deficiencies. This argument received support for both full and 
sub-sample analysis. Moreover, we further hypothesized that based on differences in investing 
MNEs size and experience, they may be able to reduce host country resource dependence including 
infrastructure. The results depicted partial support for boundary effects of MNE size and experience 
on the relationship between host country physical infrastructure and greenfield ownership strategy. 
The current study is one the first to perform such an analysis in context of greenfield investments, 
and future studies can build on it to further explore this research area using RDT as a theoretical 
basis.  
 
The current study also established the importance of host EM physical infrastructure as an 
important determinant of equity ownership strategy of MNEs in their greenfield investments 
undertaken in EMs. This aspect needs attention from both managers of MNEs aspiring to 
internationalize to EMs, as the current debate mostly focuses on the role of institutional 
infrastructure, neglecting the fact that physical infrastructure is the key for establishing a successful 
manufacturing facility. Therefore, its different aspects including road and railways infrastructure, 
telecommunications, energy supply and access to required materials, should be carefully 
considered by the managers while deciding on an optimal site for their greenfield investment 
especially in EM context. The current study has further strengthened the argument presented by 
some earlier studies regarding the importance of host country specific investment experience for 
equity ownership strategy in EMs (e.g. Arslan and Dikova, 2015, Dikova et al., 2017). The results 
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showed that host country experience moderated the impact of physical infrastructure and was a 
significant determinant of equity ownership in the context of greenfield JV investments. MNE 
managers can rely on prior experience in host country while deciding on optimal equity ownership 
strategy for their greenfield investments. The current study showed interestingly that general 
international investment experience is significant determinant for equity ownership strategy in JVs 
sub-sample. It can be argued that general international investment experience may not offer much 
insights when MNEs opt for greenfield WOSs in EMs as that choice requires dealing with 
significant amount of resource commitment, as well as dealing with legal considerations 
concerning full ownership in a context where regulations have been developing slowly. However, 
for the choice between minority and majority JV, general international experience is useful, as prior 
dealing with JV partners in other international markets including EMs can equip investing MNEs 
with negotiation and management tools helpful to deal with complex JV relationships (e.g. Yan 
and Luo, 2016, Hollender et al., 2017). Therefore, MNE managers can use insights from their 
international investment experience while devising equity ownership strategy in a collaborative 
venture in EMs experiencing infrastructure deficiencies.   
 
Our study has certain limitations as well. Firstly, we address host country physical infrastructure 
as a holistic construct in this study. However, different components of host country physical 
infrastructure like roads and railways, telecommunications, access to ports and raw materials etc, 
can influence equity ownership strategy differently. It would be interesting if future studies carry 
forward this aspect and delve more into detailed analysis concerning influences of different 
elements of physical infrastructure on greenfield investments undertaken by MNEs. Moreover, the 
current paper focused on physical infrastructure of EMs only. However, the statistics concerning 
physical infrastructure reveal that even in developed economies, it is not always in best shape as 
well as there are significant regional differences in this aspect in both developed and emerging 
markets. The current study did not address this regional variance. Future studies can enrich IB 
research by focusing on this regional variation within large countries, as well as addressing 
influences of physical infrastructure in developed economies on the greenfield investments. Finally, 
the type of greenfield investment being undertaken (i.e. resource seeking or market seeking) can 
potentially result in different types of physical infrastructure elements influencing equity 
ownership strategy. This also remains an avenue for future studies.   
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics Sample Characteristic Description Greenfield Investments 584 greenfield JVs (63.4%) and 337 greenfield WOSs (36.6%) Host country experience of investing firms Average: 5.68 years. Minimum: 0 years (No earlier experience in the host country). Maximum: 37 years. R&D Intensity Low Tech 286 investments (31.1%), Low-Medium Tech 215 investments (23.3%), Medium-Tech 331 investment (35.9%) and High Tech 89 investments (9.7%) Major investment destinations China 275 (29.9%); Poland 135 (14.7%), Russia 124 (13.5%); India 97 (10.5%), Malaysia 46 (5%); Brazil 35 (3.8%) and Mexico 34 (3.7%) Timing of investment 1990s: 570 (61.9%), 2000s: 351 (38.1%)  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations * Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
 
 Mean Std.dev 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 1. Industry -Unrelatedness 0.4 0.19 1           2. R&D intensity 2.24 0.99 -0.078 1          3. MNE International experience 36.01 42.15 -0.152* 0.086 1         4. MNE Product Diversity 9.92 11.69 0.493* -0.147* -0.124* 1        5. Host Country Ownership Freedom 6.02 1.32 -0.034 -0.028 -0.029 -0.015 1       6. Host Country Economic Growth 5.73 5.48 -0.083 0.121* 0.072 -0.61 -0.063 1      7. Host Country Risk 56.85 13.31 -0.030 0.065 0.054 -0.038 0.085 0.508* 1     8. Host Country Infrastructure 3.73 0.52 -0.042 0.043 -0.050 0.020 0.046 0.126* 0.267* 1    9. MNE Size 7.79 2.47 -0.359* 0.082 0.481* -0.305* -0.007 0.093 0.069 -0.067 1   10. MNE Host Country Experience 5.68 6.83 -0.057 o.073 0.430* -0.121* 0.065 0.027 0.062 0.056 0.519* 1  11. Greenfield Ownership Mode 0.37 0.48 0.124* 0.069 0.101 -0.143* 0.026 -0.030 -0.062 0.083 0.108* 0.112* 1 
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Table 3: Binomial logistic regression estimates full sample (greenfield WOS=1) 
 
Variable Model 1: Control Variables 
Model 2: Independent Variables 
Model 3: Moderating Influences 
Industry unrelatedness -1.036 -0.909 -0.877 Industry R&D intensity 0.110** 0.100* 0.107* 
MNE International experience 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 MNE Product Diversity -0.024** -0.025** -0022** 
 Host Country Ownership Freedom 0.054* 0.060* 0.064** 
 Host Country Economic Growth -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 
Host Country Risk -0.011* -0.018*** -0.014** 
Host Country Infrastructure  0.496***  
 MNE Size  0.019*  
MNE Host Country Experience  0.023**  
MNE Size X Host Country Infrastructure   0.018 MNE Host Country Experience X Host Country Infrastructure   0.064** N (greenfield WOS) 921 (337) 921 (337) 921 (337) 
Model x2 39.376*** 54.765*** 58.517*** 
–2 log likelihood 1170.341 1154.952 1151.201 
Nagelkerke R2 0.157 0.179 0.18 
Correctly classified (%) 73.2% 74% 74.1% 
 




































Levels of Significance: *p≤ 0.1; **p≤ 0.05; ***p≤ 0.01 
 
Variable Model 1: Control Variables 
Model 2: Independent Variables 
Model 3: Moderating Influences 
Industry unrelatedness -0.047 -0.231 -0.186 Industry R&D intensity 0.398*** 0.403*** 0.408*** 
MNE International experience 0.010** 0.013** 0.013** 
 MNE Product Diversity -0.020* -0.030** -0.029** 
 Host Country Ownership Freedom 0.129* 0.132* 0.134* 
 Host Country Economic Growth 0.036 0.034 0.036 
Host Country Risk -0.012* -0.012* -0.014* 
Host Country Infrastructure  0.030**  
 MNE Size  -0.083  
MNE Host Country Experience  0.884**  
MNE Size X Host Country Infrastructure   -0.018 MNE Host Country Experience X Host Country Infrastructure   0.013 N (majority greenfield JV) 584(227) 584(227) 584(227) 
Model x2 72.545*** 74.954*** 75.854*** 
–2 log likelihood 707.689 704.460 704.359 
Nagelkerke R2 0.158 0.163 0.167 
Correctly classified (%) 76.6% 76.8% 76.9% 
